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Cardwel v. Greene
152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998)
L Facts
On September 9, 1993, Kevin DeWayne Cardwell ("Cardwell') was con-
victed of two counts of capital murder in the death of fifteen year-old Anthony
Brown ("Brown'). The murder occurred on November 20, 1991, incident to an
abduction and robbery. Brown, a narcotics runner, arrived in Richmond with
drugs strapped to his leg. Cardwell had been alerted to Brown's arrival and, with
the aid of a friend, managed to abduct Brown. After obtaining the narcotics,
Cardwell brought Brown to a wooded area behind a shopping center and killed
him. Brown's body was found' two months later, an autopsy revealing knife
wounds to the wrist and neck and two gunshot wounds to the head.'
A year and a half separated the murder and Cardwell's indictment. Cardwell
was appointed counsel on May 20, 1993, and trial was scheduled for July 19,
1993, a mere two months later. Following the appointment of co-counsel, ajune
24 defense motion for a continuance was granted, rescheduling the trial for
September 72 After granting the continuance the trial court warned the parties
that any other cause of delay should be promptly addressed and that later contin-
uance requests would not be granted.3
Defense counsel moved to have Dr. Randy Thomas ("Dr. Thomas'), a
mental health expert, appointed. The trial court granted the motion on August 3.
When defense counsel contacted Dr. Thomas after his appointment to the case,
Dr. Thomas's office informed counsel that he was on vacation and would return
in late August. Upon learning that Dr. Thomas would need one month and a
half to perform his evaluation of Cardwell, defense counsel, on August 23,
moved for a continuance. The trial court denied the motion on the 24th of
August and the trial began, as scheduled, on September 74
Cardwell's trial lasted two days, resulting in jury convictions on two counts
of capital murder in addition to abduction, robbery and three counts of using a
firearm in the commission of a felony. The sentencing phase started on the 9th
of September with a renewed motion from defense counsel for a continuance.
Defense counsel included a preliminary report from Dr. Thomas, who suggested
that further investigation of "Cardwell's family history, the possibility of severe
abuse of drugs and alcohol, and the possibility that Cardwell had suffered brain
dysfunction or a learning disability as a consequence of a childhood head injury"
1. Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 333-34 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. The continuance meant that the trial would be held less than four months, as opposed
to two months, after the indictment.
3. Cardwel, 152 F.3d at 334.
4. Id
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was warranted.' The court denied the motion, and after the defense called only
one witness in mitigation,6 the jury recommended a sentence of death.7
On November 10, 1993, the trial court imposed the death sentence. At this
hearing, the trial judge asked defense counsel if they wished to submit any addi-
tional evidence with regard to sentencing. Fearing that no amount of mitigating
evidence would sway the trial judge, defense counsel declined the invitation,
deciding to utilize any further evidence during the appeal process.' Cardwell's
convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Supreme Court
of Virginia in 1994. Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court
in May of 1995. 9
The trial court appointed habeas counsel onJuly 7,1995, and an incomplete
petition was filed the following month. In addition, counsel filed motions to
have experts appointed in preparation for the habeas petition. The Supreme
Court of Virginia denied Cardwell's motions for the appointment of experts on
December 15, 1995, and gave counsel 30 days to amend the habeas petition. An
amended petition was filed on January 23, 1996. In May, the Supreme Court of
Virginia denied Cardwell's petition, stating that one issue had been defaulted and
"finding no merit in other complaints raised by prisoner."'"
At federal habeas, Cardwell again moved for the appointment of experts.
The district court granted this motion, appointing a neuropsychiatrist and a
clinical psychologist. The reports generated from these experts were filed with
the federal court on March 17, 1997, with a request for an evidentiary hearing.
The court expanded the record to include the expert reports, but denied Card-
well's motion for an evidentiary hearing." With regard to Cardwell's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the district court found that trial counsel had acted
below an "objective standard of reasonableness,"' 2 because counsel failed "to
secure the services of a mental health expert in a timely fashion, and.., to move
for a continuance in a timely fashion when counsel's delay jeopardized the ability
of the appointed expert to prepare an evaluation in time for trial." 3 The district
5. Id
6. Id The defense called Mrs. Donzell Cardwell, the grandmother of the defendant.
7. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 334. The jury's finding of guilt came 111 days after counsel was
appointed to Cardwell's case. The jury's recommendation of the death sentence came 112 days after
counsel was appointed to Cardwell's case.
8. Id at 335. Defense counsel apparently made this decision soon after the trial. Dr.
Thomas never completed his evaluation of Cardwell. Counsel believed that a negative finding by
the trial judge would have undercut Cardwell's claim at the appellate level. In addition, the initial
presentation of mitigating evidence to a sentencing jury is fundamentally different from attempting
to persuade a judge that there is "good cause" to overturn a jury's death sentence. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1995).
9. Id
10. Id The Supreme Court of Virginia provided no evidentiary hearing or guidance as to its
denial of the majority of issues involved in the petition other than the explanation found in the quote.
11. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 335.
12. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984).
13. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 334 (quoting Cardwell v. Netherland, 971 F.Supp. 997,1016 (E.D.
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court then concluded that Cardwell had not demonstrated the occurrence of
prejudice as a result of his attorney's failure. 4 The district court granted the
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the petition.' s Cardwell appealed the denial
of habeas relief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 6
II. Holding
Affirming the dismissal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that Cardwell was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in order to
develop the factual basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 7 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit held that Cardwell had not been denied effective
assistance of counsel. 8
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. Capital Murder Preparation Time
Perhaps the most important appellate issue in Cardwellwas never addressed
by the court. It is the question of whether Cardwell was denied the effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution when he was forced to trial within four months. During state
proceedings, the matter was summarily dismissed, because under Virginia law,
denial of a "continuance of a trial is a matter within the sound discretion of a trial
court, and its ruling will not be reversed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong.""
The federal courts did not address this important matter because it was not raised
on federal grounds. Four months is insufficient time to provide effective assis-
tance in any capital case, and that was particularly true in Cardwell.
Cardwell was denied effective assistance of counsel when the trial court
denied his motion for a continuance after Cardwell's attorney discovered that the
court-appointed mental health expert would not be able to conclude a full mental
health examination until after September 7, 1993, the scheduled commencement
of the trial. The denial of the continuance acted to deny Cardwell his right to
expert assistance in mitigation, including the development of mental health
evidence for mitigation use during the sentencing phase of trial.2'
Va. 1997)).
14. Id
15. Id at 335.
16. Id at 336.
17. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 339.
18. Id at 339-41.
19. Cardwell v. Commonwealth,450 S.E.2d 146,151 (Va. 1994). SeealsoLomaxv. Common-
wealth, 319 S.E.2d 763,765 (Va. 1984); Parish v. Commonwealth, 145 S.E.2d 192,195 (Va. 1965).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie Supp. 1998). Section 19.2-264.3:1(A) states that
upon a "motion by the attorney for the defendant charged with or convicted of capital murder
[provided that said defendant is indigent], the court shall appoint one or more qualified mental
health experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in the preparation and presenta-
tion of information concerning the defendant's history, character, or mental condition." Id
1998]
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Defense counsel should not hesitate to raise a Sixth Amendment claim
whenever the government acts to deny essential resources, including time. This
form of institutional ineffective assistance claim is not aimed at deficient individ-
ual performance by lawyers. It places responsibility for deficient performance
where it belongs, with the Commonwealth.
B. Denial of an Evidentiay Hearing
The denial at state and federal habeas of an evidentiary hearing to develop
mental health mitigating evidence represents the first of Cardwell's claims ad-
dressed by the Fourth Circuit. The Commonwealth argued that the defendant's
failure to develop facts at the state court level prevents the presentation of these
facts during federal habeas proceedings.2 Rejecting a blanket denial of eviden-
tiary hearings at the federal level, the Fourth Circuit cited the need for a thresh-
old determination of the reason for the failure to develop the facts in question.22
The court determined that an evidentiary hearing could be denied under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") 2 when the failure
of factual development occurred as a result of the petitioner's actions or omis-
sions. 4 The denial of Cardwell's motion for an evidentiary hearing resulted from
the state court's determination that a hearing was unnecessary, not because of
defense counsel's failure or omission to act at the state level. AEDPA places
no automatic bar on a petitioner's motion for an evidentiary hearin at the federal
habeas level in the circumstances involved in Cardwell's petition. "
The Fourth Circuit also looked to federal jurisprudence in determining
when a motion for an evidentiary hearing should be granted. Citing Townsend v.
Sain,27 the Fourth Circuit stated that a federal court has the power "to krant an
21. Cardwel, 152 F.3d at 338. The Commonwealth relies here on an expansive interpretation
of Keenfy v. Tamayo-Rges, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (holding that when a petitioner has caused deficiencies
in the record the state court has not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve
the claim on the merits; this leads to default of the claim). The Commonwealth relies on Keeny and
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) in arguing that an evidentiary hearing is barred by petitioner's failure to
develop facts in state court.
22. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337-38. Quoting Burrs v. Parke, 116 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1997),
cert. denieat 118 S. Ct. 462 (1997), the Fourth Circuit refused to allow the state to "insulate its decisions
from collateral attack in federal court by refusing to grant evidentiary hearings in its own courts."
Citing McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1998), the court stresses the need for an initial
showing that the petitioner is not at fault for the failure of fact development at the state level.
23. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132,1996 which
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(Supp. 1997). Section 2254(e)(2) provides that a federal court shall
not provide an evidentiary hearing unless "the claim relies on a factual predicate" undiscoverable
through due diligence or "the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." Cardwell, 152 U.S. at 336-37.
24. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337.
25. Id at 338.
26. Id
27. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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evidentiary hearing 'where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus allege[d] facts
which, if proved, would entitle him to relief."'2 In certain circumstances, a state
court's refusal to provide a full and fair evidentiary hearing mandated a hearing
at the federal level.' In Keeng v. Tamayo-Ryex,3 the United States Supreme Court
held that when a federal court finds a lack of factual development occurred at the
state level which would require an evidentiary hearing during federal habeas
proceedings, such hearing may only be granted if the petitioner had not caused
the lack of factual development below." Should the federal court find all circum-
stances favorable to the defendant, then it may grant an evidentiary hearing at its
discretion. 2
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found that it was not error to deny an
evidentiary hearing to Cardwell. The court cited the expansion of the record by
the federal district court to include the opinion of Caldwell's two mental health
experts and the petitioner's failure to cite any further evidence which would be
proffered at an evidentiary hearing as obviating the need for such a hearing.33
The court stated that the district court made an appropriate determination,
relying on all of the new evidence which the petitioner possessed and provided.34
The court's initial analysis could aid federal habeas counsel, who generally
have more resources then state habeas counsel in Virginia. These resources often
result in the development of new facts which could entitle the prisoner to relief.
Counsel's charge is to develop a factual dispute, creating a genuine issue of
material fact which will persuade a federal court to provide an evidentiary hear-
ing. Cardwell demonstrates that an evidentiary hearing will not be deemed
28. Cardwell, 152 F.3dat336 (quotingTownsendv. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,312-13 (1963),overrued
by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)).
29. Id
30. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
31. Cardwdl, 152 F.3d at 336. If the facts were not developed at state court due to an
omission or failure to act on the part of the defense counsel then an evidentiary hearing may only
be granted pursuant to one of the two scenarios listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2):
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceed-
ings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant
shows that--
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (Supp. 1997).
32. Cardwel, 152 F.3d at 336-39.
33. Id at 338-39.
34. Id
35. See David D. Leshner, An Attempt to Level the Playing Fiek" Obtaiing Resoures in State and
Federal Habeas, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 21 (1998).
1998]
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necessary simply to permit experts to explain their findings.
C Effect of Summary State Court Denials
Cardwell claimed that the Virginia habeas court's summary denial of his
individual ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding development of
mental mitigation evidence was not an "adjudication on the merits" sufficient to
invoke the restrictive review standards of AEDPA.36 The court disagreed, but
since the Supreme Court of Virginia had provided no rationale for its ruling,37 the
Fourth Circuit gave Cardwell the functional equivalent of what he asked for, de
novo review.3
Using de novo review, the Fourth Circuit determined that the record did not
support Cardwell's claim. 9 The court applied the two pronged test developed
in Strickland v. Washington.4 First, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district
court's finding that the trial counsel's performance was deficient due to a failure
to secure a mental health expert in a timely fashion.41 Turning to the second
prong of the test, the Fourth Circuit determined that any deficiency by trial
counsel would not have affected the outcome of Cardwell's sentence because the
newly developed facts only challenged one of the two aggravating factors, future
dangerousness, on which the jury based its recommendation.42 Even if the
evidence could disprove the future dangerousness of the prisoner, the lack of




36. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. 1997). Section 2254(d)(1) provides that habeas relief "shall
not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-
ings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States;..." Id
37. Although Cardwell did not prevail in federal court, given the record of the Supreme
Court of Virginia at state habeas, defense counsel should be unconcerned about, if not grateful for,
Supreme Court of Virginia unexplained summary denials.
38. Actually had the court agreed with Cardwell he would have been permitted to return to
Virginia courts to exhaust the claim. This procedure is almost unheard of in Virginia because,
unlike many other jurisdictions, claims not exhausted in state court are defaulted under the rule
found in Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974), and federal courts will not hear them.
39. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 340-41.
40. 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
41. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 340-41. The Fourth Circuit cited trial counsel's diligence in
attempting to secure a mental health expert over a two month period.
42. Id Dr. Hagan's report addressed Cardwell's future dangerousness. Dr. Hart's report
"created a more human portrait of Cardwell," but did nothing to diminish the prisoner's culpability.
Id at 341.
43. Id at 341.
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